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Hazell v. Council of the London
Borough of Hammersmith and
Fulham and others**
On January 24, 1991, the House of Lords of England rendered its decision in
Hazell v. Council of the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and
others.1 This case will surely be considered a milestone in the development of the
law applicable to swap2 transactions. The swap, a relatively young financial tool,
continues to be a largely unregulated transaction. Moreover, little jurisprudence
can be found that addresses the legality of swaps or any of the other matters
relevant to the enforcement of swaps. This legal void explains the anticipation
felt by those waiting for the House of Lords' judgment and the current excite-
ment, disappointment, and discussion about the decision.
Persons dealing regularly in the swap market are preoccupied with the reasons
and implications of the judgment. To the shock of those dealers, and to the
dismay of the banks arguing the case, the House of Lords unanimously held that
the swap transactions entered into by the Hammersmith and Fulham Council (the
Council) were ultra vires of the Council and thus contrary to law. As a direct
consequence of this decision, lawyers who advise on the matter and active traders
face particular concerns.
*Phillips & Vineberg, of Montreal, Qu6bec (Goodman Freeman Phillips & Vineberg, nationally).
Member of Qudbec and New York bars.
**The author's analysis of this case for Canadian readers appears in 7 BANKING & FIN. L. REV.
123 (1991-92).
1. 1991 All E.R. 545, [199112 W.L.R. 372.
2. For those not familiar with the subject, a swap is basically an exchange between two parties
of a series of cash flows determined, for example, in relation to fixed and floating interest rates,
which at the time the parties enter the swap contract are, as calculated by the parties, equal on a
discounted time value basis. Further helpful references include Pappe, The Ins and Outs of Swap
Transactions, 15 CAN. Bus. L.J. 158 (1989); Barken, Hedging Techniques for Interest Rate and
Currency Risks, 3 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 37 (1988-89); Evans, The Banks Under Developments
in United Kingdom Case, 6 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 151 (199 1); AntI, Markets and Techniques, in
MANAGEMENT OF INTEREST RATE RISK (B. Anti ed. 1988); and Rogers, Cunningham & Pickle,
Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions (Jan. 6, 1990) (paper by members of the
law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore).
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An understanding of the facts that the House of Lords had before it when it
rendered its decision is essential to an appreciation of the implications of this
case.
I. The Facts
Beginning in December 1983 the Council entered numerous swap transac-
tions. 3 By March 31, 1989, the Council had entered 592 swap transactions, 297
of which, at the time of the appeal, were still outstanding. The Law Lords noted
that the notional principal4 involved in the swap transactions entered into by the
Council totalled approximately £6,052 million. As of March 31, 1989, the
outstanding transactions involved notional principal totaling approximately
£2,996 million.
The House of Lords adopted a statement made in the judgment of the Divi-
sional Court5 to describe the swaps entered into by the Council:
[A]n agreement between two parties by which each agrees to pay the other on a
specified date or dates an amount calculated by reference to the interest which would
have accrued over a given period on the same notional principal sum assuming different
rates of interest are payable in each case. For example, one rate may be fixed at 10 per
cent, and the other rate may be equivalent to the six-month London Interbank Offered
Rate ("LIBOR"). If the LIBOR rate over the period of the swap is higher than 10 per
cent, then the party agreeing to receive "interest" in accordance with LIBOR will
receive more than the party entitled to receive the 10 per cent. Normally neither party
will in fact pay the sums which it has agreed to pay over the period of the swap but
instead will make a settlement on a "net payment basis" under which the party owing
the greater amount on any day simply pays the difference between the two amounts due
to the other.6
The Law Lords were of the view that the swap transactions in question were
not carried out to enable the Council to borrow money, or even to enable the
Council to choose to borrow at a fixed interest rate rather than at a variable rate,
or vice versa. Instead, the Law Lords believed that the Council was participating
in swap transactions in the hope that by successfully forecasting movements in
interest rates it could generate profits that would be used to reduce the burden of
interest payable on its borrowings.
7
The district auditor, Mr. Hazell (the appellant before the House of Lords),
discovered that the Council was participating in swaps. He argued that partici-
pation by the Council in swaps was unlawful, and he took the Council to court
3. What the Council was doing was not entirely innovative or novel. Hazell, the district auditor,
had come to the conclusion that 77 local authorities out of 450 principal local authorities entered into
approximately 400 swap transactions within a two-year period ending in 1989.
4. 1991 All E.R. at 552. In deriving swap transactions the concept of "notional principal" is
important. It is often used as a measure of the "size" of the deal.
5. [19901 2 W.L.R. 17, 52.
6. 1991 All E.R. at 550.
7. Id.
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to make his point. Although the Council was the respondent in the case and a
party to the litigation throughout, the House of Lords mentioned that the Council
felt obliged to support the auditor by agreeing that the swap transactions entered
into by it were unlawful . (Perhaps the Council's change of opinion regarding the
legality of the swap transactions was motivated by the possibility that it would,
should the transactions be held to have been ultra vires, save some money.) As
a result, the banks with whom the Council had entered many swap contracts
were, after joining the proceedings, left to defend the legality of the deals.
II. The Issue
Simply stated, the issue in the case was not whether swap transactions in
general were illegal; rather, the issue was whether the Council "possessed power
to enter into any swap contract." 9 To answer this question the House of Lords
had to identify and interpret the Council's source of authority and power, the
Local Government Act 1972 (the Act). Was the Council acting within permitted
limits? Was a swap transaction "calculated to facilitate, or conducive or inci-
dental to" borrowing? l° Although the House of Lords made passing reference to
the speculative and risky business of swaps, it did not debate whether swap
contracts were gaming or gambling activities or otherwise illegal or subject to
other laws, such as insurance laws.
HI. The Judgment
The House of Lords came to the unanimous conclusion that entering swap
contracts was beyond the legal authority of the Council and all other local
authorities subject to the Act. The swap transactions entered into since 1983 were
all, according to the House of Lords, ultra vires of the powers of the Council and
thus illegal.
IV. The Reasoning Behind the House of Lords' Decision
The House of Lords observed that pursuant to the Act a local authority has
those powers, and only those powers, vested in it by the Act or otherwise. The
Council could only do those things that were authorized by the Parliament of
England. One of the Council's authorized powers was "borrowing," as defined
and controlled by part I of schedule 13 of the Act. Another authorized power is
contained in subsection 111(1) of the Act:
Without prejudice to any power exercisable apart from this section but subject to the
provisions of this Act ... a local authority shall have power to do anything (whether
or not involving expenditure, borrowing or lending of money or the acquisition or
8. Id. at 549.
9. Id.
10. Local Government Act, 1972, ch. 70, § 111(1).
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disposal of any property or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or
incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions. (Emphasis added.)
Rejecting the appellant's argument that the local authority's power to borrow
was not a "function" within the meaning of subsection 111(1), the House of
Lords held that borrowing was a power conferred upon the Council and was a
"function," in the exercise of which the Council was permitted to do things that
were "calculated to facilitate, or [were] conducive or incidental to" that func-
tion. '1 The issue in the case then became whether a swap transaction was "cal-
culated to facilitate, or [was] conducive or incidental to" the discharge of the
Council's authorized power and function of borrowing.
In the crux of the decision the Law Lords held that a power was not "inci-
dental" under subsection 111(1) merely because it was convenient or desirable
or profitable; consequently, swap transactions were not "incidental" to the
Council's borrowing function. 12 The Law Lords rejected the view taken by the
Court of Appeal that swap transactions were incidental to the more general
function of "debt management":
Debt management is not a function. Debt management is a phrase which has been
coined in this case to describe the activities of a person who enters the swap market for
the purpose of making profits which can be employed in the payment of interest on
borrowing. The expression debt management could be employed to describe the duty
of a local authority to consider from time to time whether it should change a variable
P.W.L.B. loan into a fixed interest loan; whether it should redeem one loan and take out
another; whether when a new borrowing is contemplated, the borrowing should be at
a variable or fixed rate taking into account all the other borrowings of the local au-
thority. Debt management is a phrase which describes prudent and lawful activities on
the part of the local authority. If swap transactions were lawful a local authority would
be under a duty to consider entering into swap transactions as part of its duty of debt
management. But if a swap transaction is not lawful then it cannot be lawful for the
local authority to carry out a swap transaction under the guise of debt management. 13
Lord Ackner states further that "[a]lthough the phrase 'debt management' may
be a convenient one, swap transactions in fact leave the debt wholly unman-
aged."' 14
In a further attempt to save their deals, the banks argued that the swap trans-
actions were akin to insurance contracts protecting the Council against possible
risks. Lord Templeman responded first by making note of the huge variation in
profit and loss that may be caused by a 1 percent increase or decrease of the
LIBOR index in a swap contract based on a notional principal sum of E1 million,
and then by stating that swaps were "more akin to gambling than insurance." 15
Finally, the banks contended that if the swap transactions were ultra vires, the
result would be so harsh that the swap market, the banks, and other parties to
11. 1991 All E.R. at 554.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 558.
14. Id. at 568.
15. Id. at 559.
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swap transactions would suffer great difficulties; the creditworthiness of local
authorities would be impaired, which would in turn result in increased taxation.
The Law Lords shunned this plea by stating that even if the transactions were
ultra vires, it need not be an automatic consequence that the Council could
recover all the payments made by the Council to its counterparties, or that the
banks could not recover the monies received by the Council. 16 The consequence
of any ultra vires transaction, the House of Lords held, would depend on the facts
of the particular case.' 
7
Briefly stated, the House of Lords held that the Council, while it was able to
borrow, do other acts ordinarily given to a local authority, and do all things
incidental in the exercise of its powers, was not authorized to enter swap con-
tracts. No provision of the existing law could legitimize either directly or indi-
rectly the Council's participation in swaps.
V. Analysis
A. WAS THE CASE CORRECTLY DECIDED?
On the particular facts and given the nature of the counterparties involved, it
is difficult to argue that Hammersmith and Fulham was wrongly decided. The
only aspect in which the House of Lords may have erred was in giving too
restrictive an interpretation and application of the Council's power and function
of borrowing.
Some may argue that swaps are, or should be considered, incidental or related
to borrowing. Certainly, swaps often involve interest rates, although they may
also take the form of currency or commodity swaps. The presence of interest
rates, alone, however, does not suffice to characterize a swap as something
incidental to borrowing. A swap transaction may be entered to parallel interest on
particular borrowings, to reduce interest obligations, to hedge the party's risks,
or to give a party access to an interest market that is otherwise not accessible. But
because a party's swap or interest obligations are only based on a notional
principal and not on an actual loan, the swap does not involve borrowing.
18
Financiers, traders, economists, and other business people involved in the swap
market will concede that a swap is an obligation to make a series of payments to
a counterparty. (Such payments are calculated in reference to some indicator, for
example, fixed or floating interest rates, and a notional principal.) There is no
obligation on the counterparty to reimburse the payments made to it. There is no
loan.
16. Id. at 560.
17. Unfortunately, the decision does not reveal what effect the finding of ultra vires had on the
parties in this case. See Clifford Chance, What Prospects of Restitution After Hammersmith and
Fulham?, INTr'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1991, at 12.
18. Note that in some situations capital payments are made by and between the counterparties,
but such payments are not part of the swap. They are usually part of a more extensive agreement
between the parties.
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This is the analysis stated by Lord Ackner:
The purpose and function of swap transactions is not to facilitate, to help, or to make
more easy the discharge by the local authority of its function of borrowing. The original
underlying debt or debts continue in existence and are all unaffected by the swap
transactions. In many cases the swap transactions are entered into long after the un-
derlying borrowing and probably were not even in contemplation when such borrowing
took place. The function and purpose of the swap transactions is to alleviate the
consequences of borrowing by the local authority purchasing what has been conve-
niently called "a stream of income" or "a cash flow" which will enable it to reduce
the nett [sic] cost of its borrowing. In the words of Mr. Sumption Q.C., appearing for
Barclays Bank, interest swap transactions are "a risk mitigating activity." They are
designed not to meet any specific loss but to seek to ensure that the local authority pays
as little interest on its loans as can be achieved. In this respect they are indistinguishable
from any other transaction which involves the hope of gain, which gain is intended to
reduce a risk attendant on an underlying transaction. 19
To the extent that the Council could only do what was permitted by the Act
(that is, only those acts "calculated to facilitate, or . . .conducive or incidental
to" borrowing) the House of Lords had a difficult decision to make. In a strict
legal sense, the House of Lords was correct in holding that swaps were not
incidental to borrowing. Participants in the market will argue to the contrary-
that in practical terms (the motivation for the swap deal and how the deal is
structured) swaps are incidental to borrowing. However, for the purpose of
defining the legal authority of a legislatively created entity, swaps could be
construed to be not incidental to borrowing.
This distinction between the real world and the law is not useful and it explains
the frustration with this decision felt by those who do not observe the legal
dimension of the swap market. In a strict legal sense the decision is untouchable,
but in a practical sense the decision seems, with all due respect, to be mistaken.
In reaching this narrow interpretation of swaps and borrowing, the House of
Lords was probably affected by several factors, which are discussed below. In
any future litigation an attempt should be made to distinguish the Hammersmith
and Fulham case, or argue it was incorrectly decided, on two principal grounds:
(1) the court did not observe the reality of the swap market; and (2) the court was
affected by extrinsic factors. The first of these points was addressed above;
consideration of the second follows.
B. WHAT WERE THE FACTORS THAT MAY
HAVE INFLUENCED THE HOUSE OF
LORDS IN RENDERING THIS DECISION?
1. The Risk Involved
The risk inherent in swap deals was a factor that affected the Law Lords'
judgment. Lord Templeman stated that "[i]ndividual trading corporations and
19. 1991 All E.R. at 568.
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others may speculate as much as they please or consider prudent. But a local
authority is not a trading or currency or commercial operator with no limit on
the method or extent of its borrowing or with powers to speculate. 20 Further on
in his reasons, Lord Templeman stated that despite the arguments presented on
behalf of the banks, there were "substantial risks" involved in swaps. 2 ' As well,
Lord Ackner took the time to reiterate the fact that swap transactions involve risk
at two levels: a risk that the movements of interest rates will be contrary to what
is anticipated; and the credit risk of the counterparty.
22
2. Dealing with Taxpayers' Funds
Undoubtedly, the House of Lords was also affected by the venturing of the
local authority into a method of fund-raising (irrespective of whether the ulterior
motive was reduction of the interest burden, or the hedging of risks) that was too
risky given that it was being implemented by public funds. Lord Templeman
stated that "[t]he local authority is a public authority dealing with public mon-
eys, exercising powers limited by Schedule 13. ' ' 23 "A local authority which
borrowed in reliance on future successful swap operations would be failing in its
duty to act prudently in the interest of the ratepayers."24
3. Potential Huge Loss
Hazell's argument that if interest rates fell by 1 percent, the Council would
lose £193.5 million also affected the Law Lords. Even more frightening was the
prospect, as Hazell predicted, that if interest rates rose by 1 percent, the Council
would lose £406.3 million.2 5 The Law Lords did not want to sanction this huge
loss, which in the end would be shouldered by the taxpayers. As far as the House
of Lords was concerned, the unsuspecting taxpayers should not bear the risk of
huge loss caused by the adventurous instinct of the members of the Council.
4. Deference to Parliament
Perhaps summarizing the underlying consideration of the Law Lords, Lord
Ackner stated that:
Whether or not power should be given to local authorities to engage in interest swaps
and if so the nature of those swaps, involves a balancing operation-balancing the
advantages against the risks in the light of the overall need for such activity. This is
essentially a matter that should be left to Parliament, which, as with building societies,
may wish to proceed, if at all, by stages.26
20. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 559.
22. Id. at 568.
23. Id. at 556.
24. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 552.
26. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
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The Law Lords observed that in other circumstances Parliament had specifically
authorized swap transactions.27 The taxpayers' money was at risk, and the House
of Lords was not ready to shift the risk of the loss of such funds onto the
taxpayers without legislative authority to do so.
The above four factors had an effect on the Law Lords and their judgment. The
argument may be made that absent these four factors, a more generous interpre-
tation of the Council's powers would have been given, and that in a case where
these factors do not exist the counterparty should have the power to enter a swap.
C. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS CASE?
The importance of this case lies not in any direct binding authority over
transactions subject to Canadian or U.S. law, for it has no such effect. The fact
that the local authority of Hammersmith and Fulham could not validly enter
swaps is not what has concerned the "swap community."
Mistakenly, some of those who have read this important decision have con-
cluded that swap transactions are in and of themselves illegal because they
involve gambling. Although Lord Templeman made passing reference to this
theory, it was definitely not the basis of his decision. The Hammersmith and
Fulham case does not stand for the proposition that a swap contract is a gambling
contract. (More likely than not, however, many litigators will use Lord Temple-
man's brief statement to argue that the swaps entered into by their defaulting
clients are illegal.)
The case is important because of its significant impact upon the definition and
characterization of swap transactions. The decision may be used to argue the
following: That a counterparty having the ability to borrow and do other acts
related to borrowing, but without specific ability given to enter swaps, is not
empowered or authorized to enter a swap. This argument is a dangerous one
because many parties in the swap market do not have specific authority to deal
in swaps. The authority of a counterparty to borrow and do other acts related to
borrowing is not sufficient.
This requirement of specific authority is peculiar to cases similar to this one in
which the party can do only those things specifically authorized by law and in
which the doctrine of ultra vires may be invoked. When the doctrine of ultra vires
cannot be invoked, the party can enter swap contracts as it pleases (subject only
to applicable laws such as banking laws, laws affecting interest rates, insurance
and trust company laws, and other commercial laws). Whereas an entity such as
a local municipality or government agency can only do those things specifically
authorized, other entities can do all things so long as they adhere to the provi-
sions of law. In evaluating a counterparty, therefore, it is necessary to decide
which type of entity it is. If it is the type of entity that can only do that which is
authorized, then specific authority for a swap is necessary.
27. Id. at 559.
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The first question, therefore, is whether the counterparty can legally partici-
pate in the swap. The next logical question is, what happens when a party that
is not legally authorized to enter a swap contract does so? Will a counterparty
dealing in good faith be protected? Many persons considering the implications of
the Hammersmith and Fulham case are not worried because they are confident
that a good faith party will not be affected by the illegality, and that the obli-
gations of the party illegally participating will remain executory. Is this confi-
dence well founded? It depends on the party's legal status.
In reviewing a counterparty's legal position it is necessary to determine,
regardless of whether an ultra vires act was committed, if pursuant to its con-
stituting documents or the law, or both, that entity will remain bound and liable
to a bona fide party dealing with it. For example, in Canada, if the counterparty
is a corporation incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act
(CBCA),2 8 one may make the following arguments regarding the enforceability
of a swap contract regardless of the fact that the swap transaction is ultra vires.
(1) CBCA subsection 16(3) provides that no act or transfer of property of a
corporation is invalid by reason only that the act or transfer is contrary to the
corporation's articles or the CBCA;
(2) CBCA subsection 18(a) provides that a corporation may not assert against
the person dealing with the corporation or with any person who has acquired
rights from the corporation that the articles, bylaws, or any unanimous share-
holder agreement have not been complied with.
These provisions do not render the act that was contrary to the articles or the
CBCA untouchable. All these provisions do is protect persons dealing with the
company. The offending act remains tainted and for that reason it may be en-
joined by shareholders or be the subject of litigation between the corporation and
its personnel or other interested third parties. Therefore, even where there is a
provision that protects a good faith counterparty, it is important to review the
counterparty's authority to enter the swap. Otherwise, although neither party to
the swap could invoke the doctrine of ultra vires, the transaction or the coun-
terparty, or both, may be adversely affected by a shareholder or another inter-
ested party.
Note that for companies incorporated under the CBCA, subsection 15(1)
provides that a corporation has the capacity, rights, powers, and privileges of a
natural person. The banks in the Hammersmith and Fulham case attempted to
make this argument, but the House of Lords rejected it because there was no
statutory or other authority supporting the proposition that the Council consti-
tuted a natural person. Presumably a natural person is always entitled to enter a
swap. Subsection 15(1) of the CBCA does not go to the second level of analysis
(that is, enforceability), but rather to the first consideration of whether the entity
had the authority to enter the swap in the first place. Subsection 15(1) means that
28. R.S.C. ch. C-44 (1985).
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the doctrine of ultra vires no longer applies to CBCA companies and that from
a legal and corporate point of view a CBCA corporation may participate in swaps
without further specific authority being required.
In summary, the two questions that must be determined prior to agreeing to
enter a swap are: (1) whether the counterparty is legally entitled to specifically
participate in swaps; and (2) even if the proposed counterparty is not specifically
authorized to participate in a swap, will a bona fide transaction to which the
counterparty has committed itself be enforceable?
Under most modem company laws, provisions similar to those found in the
CBCA will afford the assurance sought by the latter question. 29 Particular at-
tention should be given to, among others, counterparties constituted by private
laws, crown corporations, insurance companies, trust companies, local govern-
ments, government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and heavily regulated mo-
nopolies, industries, and businesses.
VI. Conclusion
This recent decision by the House of Lords has thrown a degree of doubt over
the enforceability of swap contracts. As one might anticipate, banks are now
somewhat confused and nervous as to how to deal with certain counterparties.
Interestingly, the Law Lords never stated what they thought would be the con-
sequence of this ultra vires transaction. Are the parties put back, assuming this
is possible, in the financial positions in which they were before the contract was
entered? Do all parties involved in the illegal swap refund all payments received?
Does the illegality of the swap contract only affect future payments? What of a
situation in which the taxpayers are in a winning swap transaction? These are all
questions that remain unresolved subsequent to the Hammersmith and Fulham
decision.
Before the House of Lords rendered its decision it was generally thought that
once and for all the legality of swaps would be settled in the affirmative. Not only
were swap dealers looking forward to knowing that the Council had the legal
authority to enter the swap contracts, but also that swaps would not be charac-
terized as gaming contracts. The hope was that the decision would address other
questionable traits of swap contracts and dismiss them so that the swap market
could develop subject only to the dictates of the market. In the end none of these
hopes were fulfilled.
The facts of the Hammersmith and Fulham decision were quite particular and,
at least to a certain extent, the Law Lords were probably affected by the factors
discussed above. These factors and the divorce from reality that the court exer-
29. See also Delaware General Corporation Law § 124, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124 (1990),
and Company's Act 1989, § 35(A) (U.K.).
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cised could be used to distinguish the case or even to argue that it was incorrectly
decided.
What progress has been made? The decision does not mean that swaps are
entirely legal. Nor does it mean that swap contracts are illegal. What the decision
tells swap dealers is that they must do their due diligence research in a more
thorough fashion and not to assume that the swap is always within the authority
of their counterparty. Many more cases will have to be decided before the
questions discussed in this commentary and the issues raised by the Hammer-
smith and Fulham judgment will be resolved.
Before the House of Lords rendered its decision many were of the view that
the House of Lords would never come down against the swaps. Similarly, today
traders in other financial centers around the world are stating that if similar
questions were to be raised in their jurisdictions, the swap would surely be held
by their more open-minded, commercially astute, and progressive courts to be
legal in all respects and binding. Was this attitude justified before the Hammer-
smith and Fulham decision? Apparently not. Is this attitude justified in the light
of the Hammersmith and Fulham decision?
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